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SHORTER ESSAY
The Division of Labor Under Homogeneity
A Critique of Mises and Rothbard
By WALTER BLOCK, PER HENRIK HANSEN, and PETER G. KLEIN*
ABSTRACT. Even the most passionate defenders of free trade, such as
Mises and Rothbard, claim that trade cannot occur under conditions of
strict homogeneity of land, labor, and capital. We show that special-
ization, trade, and the division of labor can emerge even when
resources are initially homogenous, due to “natural heterogeneity,”
economies of scale, and learning.
Perhaps no proposition in economic theory is better established than
the idea of gains from trade. The insight that voluntary exchange is
mutually beneficial was articulated as early as the 13th century by
Richard of Middleton (de Roover 1963: 338), reaching its full expres-
sion in Ricardo’s ([1817] 1951) law of association, or the principle of
comparative advantage. These insights are not always well under-
stood, of course. The mercantilist view of trade suffers from what
Mises (1966: 664) calls the “Montaigne fallacy,” the belief that trade
benefits one party at the expense of the other.1
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This article attempts to clarify an assumption underlying the prin-
ciple of gains from trade. Most expositors begin by stating that trade
is mutually beneficial only if factors of production vary in their
attributes. Resource heterogeneity is thus a prerequisite for the gains
from trade. Mises (1966: 157), for example, states that “if the earth’s
surface were such that the physical conditions of production were the
same at every point and if one man were . . . equal to all other
men . . . [the] division of labor would not offer any advantages for
acting man.” Rothbard (1962: 82) adds: “It is a fact that, superimposed
on the basic unity of species and objects in nature, there is a great
diversity. Particularly is there variety in the . . . factors that would give
rise to specialization: in the locations and types of natural resources
and in the ability, skills, and tastes of human beings. . . . It is clear that
conditions for exchange, and therefore increased productivity for the
participants, will occur where each party has a superiority in produc-
tivity in regard to one of the goods exchanged—a superiority that may
be due either to better nature given factors or to the ability of the
producer.” Further, Rothbard (1982: 35) maintains: “If all people were
equally skilled and equally interested in all matters, and if all areas of
land were homogeneous with all others, there would be no room for
exchanges.”
We argue here that specialization, trade, and the division of labor
can take place even if all human and nonhuman resources were
exactly alike. We do not disagree with Mises and Rothbard that
resource heterogeneity is sufficient to create gains from trade.2
However, we deny that resource heterogeneity is a necessary condi-
tion in order for gains from trade to be possible. In other words, a
division of labor can exist even under resource homogeneity.
Suppose that human beings were all completely interchangeable;
they had the same skills, capacities, initiative, intelligence, tastes, and
so on as each other. Posit, further, that all land, too, was completely
homogeneous: equally fertile, equally watered, equally ground
covered, with equal access to whatever amenity anyone cared to
name. In addition, we assume that all people and resources are
located randomly throughout the world; that is, that there is no
grouping of either persons or raw materials based upon any unique or
even different characteristics; there cannot be, in any case, because of
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our other homogeneity assumptions. Under these admittedly unreal-
istic conditions, would trade be possible, or would all the people
depicted in this scenario be forced to rely solely upon self-sufficient
production?
Rothbard states in this regard:
In describing the conditions that must obtain for interpersonal exchange to
take place (such as reverse valuations), we implicitly assumed that it must
be two different goods that are being exchanged. If Crusoe at his end of the
island produced only berries, and Jackson at his end produced only the
same kind of berries, then no basis for exchange between them would
occur. If Jackson produced two hundred berries and Crusoe one hundred
fifty, it would be nonsensical to assume that any exchange of berries would
be made between them. (1992: 80)
We agree with Rothbard that at least two goods are needed, but
maintain that resource heterogeneity does not imply a one-good
model. Suppose, for example, that there are two people, Jackson and
Crusoe, each with equal abilities, and that there are two goods, fish
and berries, such that each of these people can, at the outset, produce
an identical number of each product. Let us assume for illustration
purposes that both can produce 200 berries, and 20 fish, in a two-day
period. We posit a very simple world with no capital goods. Berries
are picked by hand, and fish are caught by grabbing them, as is now
done by bears. We concede that under these conditions no trade will
occur, and certainly productivity could not thereby be enhanced.3
However, under reasonably weak assumptions, conditions for
mutually beneficial exchange can emerge. First, individuals can never
be 100 percent identical, simply because they cannot occupy the same
physical space. Even if they are completely identical in every other
regard, it is possible (though not necessary) that they have different
access to complementary resources. Imagine that the berry bushes are
adjacent to the beach. If Crusoe is standing a tiny bit closer to the
berry bushes, and Jackson a tiny bit closer to the water, then there are
gains from trade by Crusoe specializing in berries and Jackson spe-
cializing in fish. That is, the two laborers are identical in each aspect
besides location, but they have different costs of production. The one
closet to berries has a lower cost of berry production than the one
closest to fish, and so on.
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More generally, location is a unique attribute, an ontological fact
about the real world. One of the characteristics of any resource is its
location. That means that, strictly speaking, there is and can be no
such thing as completely homogeneous resources. George’s (2003)
great insight was that no two plots of land are really identical because
land always exists at a particular location. Location is nonreplicable,
and this gives rise to certain specific patterns of income distribution.4
Second, from a subjectivist, Austrian perspective, the value of a
resource as used in production is driven not by its objective, physical
characteristics, but by its place in the structure of production, as
conceived by entrepreneurs.5 Even resources that are physically iden-
tical (subject to the caveat about location just discussed) are not
“identical” in the sense relevant to economic analysis. We can imagine
that Crusoe’s and Jackson’s island is also inhabited by entrepreneurs
who organize fish and berry production, hiring Crusoe and Jackson as
employees. The “true” value of Crusoe’s and Jackson’s labor in either
production process is unknown. One entrepreneur estimates Crusoe’s
marginal productivity as sufficient to make berry production profitable
but not fish production, so she hires Crusoe, placing him into the
economy’s production process for berries. Another entrepreneur then
hires Jackson to produce fish. The labor services of Crusoe and
Jackson are now heterogeneous resources, meaning that they are
assigned different positions in the economy’s capital structure, even
though Cruse and Jackson are identical human beings.
Even if we ignored these points about what we might call “natural”
or “ontological” heterogeneity, there would be additional sources of
potential gains. In both cases, individuals start out identical, but
become differentiated by their actions.
Let us develop this point further. Assume now that Crusoe and
Jackson are equidistant from berries and fish. Is it still possible for
each to “gravitate” to a different resource and, having done so, come
to specialize in that one and thereby raise productivity? Such a state of
affairs might be considered an accident,6 but there is no reason to rule
it out. Not every Crusoe and Jackson pair might arrange matters in
such a way, but it is difficult to see why none of these hypothetical
pairs could do so. If one or both production processes are character-
ized by increasing returns to scale, then such specialization—even if
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random—results in net gains. It does not seem unrealistic to expect
that over time Jackson and Crusoe—being rational human beings—
will realize from their experience in autarchy that the more they
produce the better they get at it. They will eventually also realize that
the larger the scale of production the better are the opportunities for
the use of tools and eventually mechanization of production. When
one of them, let us say Crusoe, has so realized, we can imagine that
he approaches Jackson and explains this to him. They then agree each
to specialize in production of a different good in order to be able to
share a larger amount of both at the end of the period.
How would they agree on who would specialize in what? One
possibility is that they have different preferences for the attributes of
the work environment they consume while working. Producing fish
and “fishing” are not separable; one may enjoy fishing while the other
enjoys tending berry plants. However, they could also draw lots or
simply agree to change production lines every other period.7 The
point is that having realized the prospect of a potential welfare gain,
Jackson and Crusoe will be very resourceful. Mises seems to agree
with this, as he writes:
If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than
isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human
action itself tends toward cooperation and association; man becomes a
social being not in sacrificing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical
Moloch, society, but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare.
(1966: 160)8
There is another and perhaps more likely way that specialization
could come about. Crusoe—having realized the potential gains of
specialization—could start, unilaterally, to change the proportions
of his own production of the two goods. Assuming that there are
increasing returns to scale, this action by Crusoe would imply that the
relationship between the two goods in terms of opportunity costs will
be different when seen from the perspective of Crusoe relative to that
of Jackson. The different marginal transformation rates between the
two goods for Crusoe and Jackson would then provide the basis for
beneficial marginal trade between them. This initial change by Crusoe
will be reinforced by their new experience.
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Even in the absence of scale economies, if there are “learning
effects” (i.e., average cost is a decreasing function of accumulated
output), then one or both workers can lower his average costs over
time.9 Assume that if the two of them specialized, it matters not one
whit in which of these two goods, that the productivity of each would
be improved. For example, if Jackson concentrated on picking berries
alone, and Crusoe focused on fishing only, let us suppose that the
former could pick 500 berries in two days, while the latter could catch
50 fish in that amount of time. Together, they could each potentially10
have more of both goods than if each worked in isolation, without
trade. We do not need heterogeneity to reach this conclusion, only the
supposition that specialization enhances productivity. Learning is par-
ticularly important in this geographical or “locational” analysis. This is
in sharp contradistinction to the typical textbook models of equilib-
rium economics, which either ignore these crucial elements of eco-
nomics or give them short shrift.
In short, even under complete homogeneity, specialization, division
of labor, and trade can arise. A sufficient condition for such trade to
arise is simply that learning and practice bring improvement. This is
significant in that it demonstrates the robustness of free trade: it can
take place even in the face of homogeneity. Even such notable
defenders of free trade as Mises and Rothbard did not make this point
explicit in their analysis.11
Notes
1. Even today, the Montaigne fallacy plagues discussions of outsourcing,
“off-shoring,” and increased international capital mobility. Irwin (2005) sum-
marizes recent controversies over trade theory and policy.
2. In making this claim, we are implicitly assuming a whole host of other
factors to be in play: sufficient knowledge, a legal system supportive of trade
or at least not too disruptive of it, and so forth.
3. If tastes were different, trade might well occur. Let us suppose that
Jackson was a vegetarian, a herbivore, and Crusoe a carnivore. Under these
conditions, Crusoe would give up his berries for the fish of Jackson; thus,
specialization, the division of labor, and greater productivity would ensue. But
we are assuming complete homogeneity, including tastes, so this result is
ruled out.
4. The authors are grateful to Laurence Moss for this point. For more on
George, see Moss (2001, 2005).
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5. More precisely, it is not physical assets themselves, but their
attributes—the characteristics, functions, or possible uses of assets, as
perceived by entrepreneurs—that are valued and priced on factor markets. On
this point, see Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2007).
6. We abstract from all issues related to indifference; for example, if they
were both equidistant from berries and fish, would they just stand there like
Buridan’s Ass, and starve to death? For a debate on indifference, see Nozick
(1977), Block (1980, 1999, 2003), Caplan (1999, 2000, 2001), Hülsmann (1999),
and Hoppe (2005).
7. If they did this, some of the benefits from practice would be lost, but
it still might well be a better outcome than no trade at all.
8. It cannot be denied that heterogeneity is of considerable helpfulness in
getting the division of labor underway. And that, really, is an understatement.
We readily concede that without heterogeneity, the amount of specialization
would be very small. Perhaps it might not even exist at all. But it might. There
is no theoretical reason why it could not, Mises and Rothbard to the contrary
notwithstanding.
9. Both Mises and Rothbard accept the idea of learning by doing. Mises
(1966: 164) writes: “Exercise and practice of specific tasks adjust individuals
better to the requirements of their performance; men develop some of their
inborn faculties and stunt the development of others. Vocational types
emerge, people become specialists.” Adds Rothbard (1962: 82): “full-time
specialization in a line of production is likely to improve each person’s
productivity in that line and intensify the relative superiority of each.”
10. Depending upon the terms of trade that were agreed upon; at the very
least, neither would have less.
11. One could respond that neither Mises nor Rothbard intended to
generalize their statements quoted above beyond an environment of constant
returns and no learning effects. They left no indication that they meant to
include such qualifiers, however. We thank a referee for raising this point.
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